In the Kantian system, the real external—and we may add, internal, disappears more and more as we advance; and when we rise beyond the categories which are the rules by which we combine phenomena, to the ideas of pure reason which give a unity to the categories—we have left it behind altogether. Having begun with a shadow, we must end with a shadow becoming fainter and fainter, or rather with a rejection of that shadow. But let us begin with a reality, and apply the understanding to it according to logical laws; and we shall find that we are not led into contradictions nor scepticism, but conducted to farther truths (not however to all truths) also implying a reality.

Somewhat allied to the doctrine of the Phenomenality, is that of the KELJLTIVTTY of human knowledge. Sir W. Hamilton has shewn that there has been a doctrine of relativity held from the beginning of speculation down to the present time. We might argue that this circumstance does not prove the dogma to be sound, any more than the maintenance from an ancient date of the ideal theory of perception proves that theory to be correct. But instead of urging this, we aver that the generally entertained doctrine of relativity (which contains a truth often vaguely expressed) is not the same as that elaborated with such analytic skill and logical power by Sir W. Hamilton. It is known to Sir William, .that Reid did not uniformly hold the doctrine in the sense of his learned commentator, for he says, (Hamilton's Reid, p. 313,). that our " senses give us a direct and a distinct notion of the primary qualities, and inform us what they are in themselves."

As Sir William Hamilton has not fully unfolded his theory, we are not in circumstances to examine it fairly. If we are misinterpreting him, to retract these objections will give us pleasure—such as we have not felt in advancing them. We confess that we have found a difficulty in understanding precisely what is meant by the phrases employed. Our knowledge is said to be in itself, and of the phenomenal, relative, conditioned, finite. " Our knowledge of mind and of matter is relative—conditioned—relatively conditioned.'* "All that we know is phsenomenal—pbseno-menal of the unknown." (Discussions, p. 608.) Do these phrases always denote or imply the same thing ? Is the relative necessarily phenomenal ? Is the relative necessarily conditioned ? May there not be relations which are not conditions ? Is every thing relative necessarily finite ? God stands in a relation to his works ; but this does not appear to make these works stand to him in the relation of a con- „ dition. It does not make God finite that he stands in a relation to creation.

Man!s knowledge is limited ; but it is as his sense and range of vision are limited. The eye sees so much when it looks out on the broad ocean, but there is more that it does not see. So it is with man's mental apprehension. Man does not, cannot know everything; nay, he does not seem to know all about any one thing, material, mental, or Divine. Of the many properties possessed by body or spirit, (not to speak of the Divine Spirit,) he knows only a few. His knowledge of no

one thing is absolute, in the sense of being a complete knowledge of that one thing.—Still his knowledge is not of relations, limits, conditions, appearances, but of things to a certain extent, and as presented to him. And this knowledge, though contracted, may be true and sound, so far as it goes, and if he knew more, it would not set aside or modify our previous knowledge, but merely expand it.

In order to express that man's knowledge is confined, some writers say that we know objects merely in relation to our faculties. But they do not thereby mean, that man knows merely phenomena and not things, not things themselves, but tilings under a relation. They mean simply that we have not faculties to know all